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 The World Bank’s World Development
Report 2006 on Equity and Development, on
which this paper is based, argues that greater
equity, intended as greater equality of oppor-
tunities and the avoidance of extreme depri-
vation, is a key ingredient of long-term pros-
perity.  The report describes how opportuni-
ties vary widely within and across countries
on the basis of predetermined characteristics,
rather than just preferences, talent, effort,
luck.  It presents two main reasons why
inequities, in addition to being unjust, are
detrimental to development: first, people
who do not face the same opportunities waste
part of their potential; second, when the dis-
tribution of power and wealth is inequitable,
powerful elites tend to put in place econom-
ic institutions that benefit only themselves, at
significant cost to society as a whole.  
The WDR 2006 argues that developing
country governments should act to level the
playing field in the crucial areas of human
capacities, justice and the rule of law, land
and access to infrastructure, and in the broad
functioning of markets and the macroecono-
my. Where there are trade-offs between equi-
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People around the world do not have the same chances to live, learn, work, and participate
in society’s activities, because these opportunities are greatly influenced by circumstances
beyond their control, including their country of birth.  Global equity is worth pursuing
for its own sake and for greater global prosperity.  Concrete changes in global policies and
global governance are needed to bring about greater equity: better aid to help poor coun-
tries make up for limited endowments, more space for legal migration of unskilled work-
ers, more open trade (particularly for agricultural goods), less restrictive protection of intel-
lectual property rights, and reforms in global governance.
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 ty and efficiency, both the long-term benefits
of equity and the efficiency costs of tamper-
ing with individual incentives need to be
taken into account.
While action within countries is crucial,
global conditions powerfully affect the scope
for and impact of domestic policies.
Complementing other articles on the report
(see for instance Ferreira and Walton, 2006),
this paper focuses on the global dimension of
equity: what do we know about inequities on
a global scale, why they matter, and what can
be done to reduce them.  In line with the
WDR 2006, it highlights the key role played
by developed country policies in supporting
greater global equity.    
Differences in opportunities are 
massive in the world
Since opportunities are potentials, rather
than actual observables, we do not measure
them directly but rely instead on analyzing
indicators across different groups defined on
the basis of predetermined circumstances.
Systematic differences across such groups are
an indication that predetermined circum-
stances matter, instead of being irrelevant.  
Country of birth is one such predeter-
mined circumstance.  There is no question
that opportunities are vastly different in the
world depending on where a person is born.
This is true for the opportunities to live,
learn, earn and consume, participate in poli-
tics and social life.  Compare, for example,
some basic facts of life in Mali, ranked 174th
out of 177 countries in the UNDP’s Human
Development Index, and the United States,
ranked 10th.2 In Mali, 130 out of 1000 chil-
dren die in their first year of life (and even
among the better off, 90 out of 1000 die),
and an additional 110 children out of 1000
die before turning five.  In the United States,
only four children out of 1000 die in their
first year of life, and one more out of 1000 in
the first five years.  Average life expectancy in
Mali is 48 years, in the U.S. 77 years.  An
average Malian born in 1975-79 has on aver-
age less than two years of schooling; a
woman, less than one.  An average American
of the same age (male or female) has on aver-
age 14 years of schooling—and this differ-
ence would be even more striking if adjusted
by quality. Average consumption in Mali was
$54 per person per month in 1994; an aver-
age American spent about 20 times as much
at that time.  
These differences are illustrative of differ-
ences in many other indicators and across
many other countries.  Figure 1 focuses on
infant mortality rates (the dark dots connect-
ed by the line), which vary from 25 per 1000
live births in Colombia to almost 150 per
1000 in Mozambique—almost six times as
much.3
Over time, some differences across coun-
tries have been narrowing while others have
been increasing.  Differences in life expectan-
cy and years of schooling have narrowed.
The top panel in Figure 2 shows that life
expectancy at birth (weighted by population)
increased on average from 53 in 1960 to 65
in 2000.  The distribution was clearly
bimodal in 1960, with 50 countries having
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2. The Human Development Index combines indicators for life expectancy, adult literacy, gross enrollment for
primary, secondary, and tertiary schools, and GDP per capita (see United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP) 2005).  By comparison, Norway is ranked 1st, Sweden 6th, Finland 13th, and Denmark 14th.  
3. The figure also illustrates differences within countries.  The vertical bars indicate, for each country, the spread
between infant mortality rates for children whose mothers have no education (at the top) and those for chil-
dren whose mothers have secondary or higher education (at the bottom).life expectancies between 35 and 45 years and
41 countries with life expectancies between
65 and 75 years.  By 1980, the low mode had
mostly disappeared and the distribution had
shifted considerably to the right.
Unfortunately, the story is not entirely posi-
tive: by 2000 a low mode was beginning to
reappear, capturing the dramatic impact of
AIDS on life expectancy in Sub-Saharan
Africa.
The bottom panel of Figure 2 shows that
average years of schooling (again population-
weighted) increased on average from 4.4 in
1960 to 6.6 in 2000, as schooling expanded
in the Middle East and North Africa, South
Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa.  Differences
narrowed not just across countries but also
between men and women.  
However, the convergence in educational
outcomes measured by years of schooling
completed masks the wide gap that still exists
in the quality of education.  Looking at edu-
cational attainment in five middle-income
countries for which data on a standardized
international achievement test are available,
Pritchett (2004) finds that at most 25 percent
of eighth-graders do as well as OECD stu-
dents in mathematics (figure 3).  In
Morocco, for instance, less than 5 percent of
children aged 15-19 score as well as their
OECD peers, while another 10 percent com-
plete grade 9 but do poorly on the test.  Of
the remaining 85 percent, 35 percent never
went to school, 15 percent dropped out
before completing grade 5, and 35 percent
dropped out before completing grade 9.
These and other data suggest that, while aver-
age years of schooling have increased, the gap
in learning achievement remains large.  
Differences in consumption levels across
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Figure 1: Infant mortality rates vary greatly across countries
Source: World Bank (2005).  Data come from the most recent Demographic and Health Survey available (ranging from 1985 to 2002).countries remain large.  The consumption
levels of the rich in many poor countries
remains at levels lower than those of the poor
in rich countries.  Figure 4 illustrates these
differences by plotting the 10th and 90th
percentiles, mean and median of consump-
tion or income for 20 countries.  Even indi-
viduals earning mean income in Argentina or
Brazil earn less than individuals at the tenth
percentile in the OECD countries in the fig-
ure.  Countries known for wide differences
between rich and poor—Argentina, Brazil,
South Africa, the United States, but also
Ireland and Israel—do indeed reveal large
absolute gaps, while countries such as China
and India, where there has been concern
about growing inequality, still show much
smaller absolute differences in consumption
levels between the top and the bottom of the
distribution.  
The convergence observed over time in
life expectancy and years of education is not
matched by similar clear-cut evidence on
incomes and consumption levels.  If we
examine intercountry inequality, where each
country counts for one with its mean
income, whether it is Chad (9 million peo-
ple) or China (1.3 billion people), we find
that it has increased over the last 50 years.
Another way to examine inequality is to
weigh each country by its population, assign-
ing each person his or her country’s mean
income.  This indicator, which the WDR
2006 termed international inequality, has
declined over the last 50 years, in contrast
with intercountry inequality.  But the decline
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Figure 2: Differences in life expectancy at birth (top panel) and years of schooling (bottom
panel) have narrowed during the last half century
Source: Schady (2005).is almost entirely due to the fact that the two
most populous countries, China and India,
have been catching up with the rest of the
world (see figure 5).  
In calculating international inequality,
each person is assigned his/her country’s aver-
age income.  But the increasing availability of
household survey data since the 1980s now
makes it possible to estimate people’s
incomes (or consumption levels) rather than
rely on country averages.  We can then calcu-
late  global inequality, the inequality of
incomes between the citizens of the world,
ignoring national boundaries.  Trends in this
measure are much debated.  The data used
for the WDR 2006 indicate it has not
changed much over the last twenty years (fig-
ure 6, top line), with a decrease in the
between-country component being offset by
an increase in the within-country component
(bottom two lines).  Rough estimates going
back two centuries, however, show a signifi-
cant increase over the long run (Bourguignon
and Morrisson, 2002).  
In sum, in contrast to what has happened
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Figure 3: Only a small share of students in
five middle-income countries learn as much
as their OECD peers
Source: World Bank (2005), adapted from Pritchett (2004).  The figures
are based on TIMSS-R scores for eighth graders on mathematics in
1999, assumed to be similar to those of ninth graders.  Students with
scores lower than the OECD median minus one standard deviation are
considered to be performing poorly.  
Figure 4: Consumption levels/incomes also vary greatly across countries
Source: World Bank (2005). 
Data come from household
consumption/income surveys,
expressed in 1993 purchasing
power parity (PPP) dollars. Years
range from 1997 to 2002. The left
end of each line indicates the 10th
percentile, the right end the 90th
percentile. The two edges of each
box indicate median and mean. 
Income data for Argentina, Brazil,
Israel, Ireland, Denmark, and the
United States; consumption data
for all other countries in the figure.with life expectancy and years of schooling,
differences in income/consumption across
the world’s individuals have increased over
the long term, even though this trend has
been countered in the last twenty years by the
very rapid progress of China and India.  
Progress in China and India should not be
underplayed: China alone managed to lift
more than 400 million people out of extreme
monetary poverty (measured at $1 per day).
At the same time, this progress should not
obfuscate the fact that several countries, espe-
cially in Sub-Saharan Africa, have fallen
behind and many in these countries are worse
off today than they were twenty years ago.
These are the countries above the 45-degree
line in figure 7, which plots the incidence of
extreme poverty in 1981 and 2001—among
them Niger, Nigeria, Zambia, Zimbabwe.  
To conclude this section, we can say that
there are major differences across countries in
people’s opportunities to live long and
healthy lives, to learn, to get jobs, to earn a
decent living, to access public services, to
have their voices heard and to participate in
political life.  While some of these differences
have narrowed over time, most remain
extremely high.
Why does global inequity matters?
Do these differences in opportunities matter?
In WDR 2006, we argue that they do; that
the great differences in opportunities we live
with today are not conducive to long-term
prosperity.  Domestically, two mechanisms
are at play.  First, in the presence of market
imperfections, individuals with power and
wealth are often able to exploit markets to
their advantage while others are unable to
fully use their talents and potential.  The
poor may not be have access to education, or
access only poor-quality schools.  So some
bright poor children will not get educated
and their potential may be wasted.  Second,
narrow, powerful elites tend to put in place
and maintain economic institutions that ben-
efit only themselves.
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Figure 5:  Intercountry inequality has
increased while international inequality has
declined, thanks to China and India
Source: Milanovic (2005).
Figure 6: Global inequality has not changed
much over the last twenty years
Source: World Bank (2005)Internationally, there is little empirical
work on the impact of inequities on global
prosperity, partly because of data limitations.
But it is clear that there are several channels
through which inequities impact global well-
being.  Scholars have looked for instance at
the linkages between inequalities in access to
a clean and healthy environment and sustain-
able development.  Chaudhry, Lynch, and
Magraw (2002) for example argue that a
more equitable sharing of the costs and ben-
efits of protecting the environment is a key
principle to achieve environmental justice
and sustainable development.  
Others have looked at the linkages
between and between inequalities, conflict,
and development.  Wolfensohn and
Bourguignon (2004:30) suggest that “widen-
ing gaps and better information may have
serious implications for peace and security”
and that “growing disparities in standards of
living [...] feed radicalism of all types, some
leading to movements to disrupt national
and international orders”.  Conflict is
extremely costly. Chauvet and Collier (2004)
estimate that a country descending into con-
flict causes a loss of approximately $80 bil-
lion in present value terms, borne mostly by
its neighbors.  Failed states can also provide a
haven for illegal activities.  Peace-keeping and
reconstruction impose costs on richer
nations.  In sum, “growing disparities seem
likely to sow disorder and conflict, both
nationally and internationally, with the dam-
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Figure 7: Extreme monetary poverty (consumption below $1/day) has declined globally,
but not in every country
Source: PovcalNet (http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/jsp/index.jsp).age spreading through developing and devel-
oped countries.” (Wolfensohn and
Bourguignon, 2004:31).  
Finally, the possibility that inequities can
reduce global prosperity is not the only rea-
son to care about global equity.  Many citi-
zens of the world share the belief that all
should have equal rights and be spared
extreme deprivation, as testified by support
for the human rights covenants.  The “intrin-
sic” value many people place on equity is suf-
ficient reason to justify interventions that
lead to greater global equity, to which we
now turn.   
Policies towards greater global equity
Traditionally, rich countries have responded
to global inequities by providing aid.  But
aid—even more, better aid—is not going to
be enough.  More equitable policies on
migration, trade, intellectual property rights,
capital flows, and the management of natural
resources all need to be part of a package of
pro-equity global policies.
Aid
The WDR 2006 joins reports by other agen-
cies such as the United Nations Development
Program in calling for more, better delivered
aid (see UNDP, 2005).  Considering aid
through the lens of equity enriches the dis-
cussion of the allocation of aid across coun-
tries.  Following work by Burnside and
Dollar (2000) and Collier and Dollar (2001,
2002), a lively debate has emerged on
whether aid should in fact be allocated to
countries that have good policies and institu-
tions.  Hansen and Tarp (2001) and others
have argued that different country circum-
stances—analogous to predetermined cir-
cumstances at birth in the case of individu-
als—ought to play a role in aid allocations.
Cogneau and Naudet (2004) worked out an
aid allocation rule, alternative to that of
Collier and Dollar, that takes into account
geographical, historical, economic disadvan-
tages, and showed that this allocation rule
would reduce differences across countries in
the risk of being poor while still significantly
reducing global poverty.  
In sum, an equity perspective, while not
suggesting that good policies and institutions
are not important, underscores the need to
help countries overcome structural disadvan-
tages.  Aid should be spent where it effective-
ly expands the opportunities of those who
have the least.  Donors actually do, to some
extent, provide aid to the poorest countries
even if their policies and institutions are lag-
ging, and the poorest communities in poor
countries, but more research is needed to
fully understand how aid can be most effec-
tive in difficult policy and institutional envi-
ronments.   
The functioning of markets for labor,
goods, and ideas
Greater global equity requires action well
beyond aid.  While providing aid with one
hand, with the other rich countries routinely
turn the functioning of imperfect markets to
their advantage, thus making it more difficult
for poor countries to close the gap in oppor-
tunities.  We will look at three examples.
Consider first the functioning of the interna-
tional labor market.  Wage differentials are
larger today than they were during a period
of large-scale migration such as the 1870s
(see figure 8).  With such differentials, and
much improved transport and communica-
tion systems, it is not surprising that migra-
tion flows are substantial today.  Yet, migra-
tion of unskilled workers is highly restricted.
Often people migrate illegally, with heavy
consequences in terms of their opportunities
and sometimes their lives.  Economic analy-
sis indicates that the efficiency gains from
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(see for example Walmsley and Winters,
2003), and would accrue largely to migrants,
thus directly improving their living stan-
dards.  Making progress in resolving the com-
plex issues of economic, social, and cultural
integration that rock European countries
today and block progress on migration poli-
cies is fundamental from an equity stand-
point.  
Let us turn now to the market for goods.
Global trade in goods and services is all but
left to the free hand of “the market”.
Complex rules, the result of highly political
international negotiations, govern the func-
tioning of the global markets for every good
and service, and generally protect the inter-
ests of stronger trading partners more than
those of weaker ones.  While examples
abound in almost every market, we will focus
on agricultural goods and look at the specific
example of cotton.  Agricultural trade is not
huge; in 2003 it accounted for 9 percent of
global merchandise exports and 11 percent of
developing countries’ merchandise exports.
But agriculture is the main source of income
for millions of people in developing countries
and the potential benefits from liberalization
are significant.  Anderson and Martin (2005)
calculate that distortions on agricultural mar-
kets account for more than three-fifths of the
global gains forgone because of distortions in
merchandise trade, gains which they place at
$300 billion per year by 2015.    
Agricultural trade distortions come in
three main forms: high tariffs, huge producer
subsidies, and subsidies to exporters.  Of the
three, tariffs have the greatest negative
impact.  On average, developing country
producers face tariffs of 16 percent for their
agricultural goods, compared to 9 percent on
apparel and 2.5 percent on other manufac-
tures.  The removal of tariffs would account
for more than 90 percent of total gains from
agricultural liberalization (Martin and
Anderson, 2005).  Unfortunately, five years
after the start of the Doha Round of talks
under the World Trade Organization, there
has been almost no progress.  In July 2004 an
agreement was reached to reduce higher tar-
iffs the most,4 but discussions since have
revolved around a formula for tariff reduc-
tions with no major substantive agreement
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Figure 8: Wage differentials between receiv-
ing and sending countries were larger in the
1990s than in the 1870s (ratios of wages in
purchasing power parity terms between
pairs of countries)
Source: Pritchett (2003).
4. The decisions taken at the WTO General Council meeting in July 2004 are known as the “July package” (WTO
2004).on key matters.  Moreover, exceptions are
foreseen for sensitive products, which alone
could reduce gains by as much as three-quar-
ters (Anderson and Martin, 2005).  
While not as damaging as tariffs, subsidies
are nonetheless huge.  The OECD estimates
that producer support was about $240 billion
in 2001-2003, or 31 percent of total farm
receipts.  In other words, a whole third of
income for OECD farmers comes from pub-
lic subsidies.  OECD governments are much
more generous with farmers than they are
with developing countries: aid was only one-
quarter of subsidies in 2003 (figure 9).    
While the WTO July 2004 package
included an agreement to substantially
reduce trade-distorting subsidies, it was clear
in the run-up to the December 2005 Hong
Kong WTO Ministerial meeting that there is
strong opposition to cutting subsidies in sev-
eral OECD countries, most visibly France.
In Hong Kong, agreement was reached only
on eliminating the third type of distortions,
export subsidies, the least significant of the
three, and even then only by 2013.  In short,
progress so far under the Doha Round has
been very limited and much remains to be
done to level the playing field on global agri-
cultural markets.5
Cotton provides a good illustration of
how difficult and elusive progress in eliminat-
ing subsidies is.  Subsidies to cotton produc-
ers were estimated to be around $5.8 billion
in for the 2001/02 growing season
(International Cotton Advisory Committee,
2003), $3.3 billion of which in the United
States alone, going to about 25,000 cotton
growers.6 These subsidies lowered world
prices by as much as 71 percent in 2001/02
according to estimates (Baffes, 2004).    
Cotton is a crucial commodity for an esti-
mated 10 million African smallholders, no
doubt much poorer than American cotton
farmers.  A study found that a 40 percent
reduction in farmgate cotton prices—equiva-
lent to the price decline from December
2000 to May 2002—implied an increase in
the incidence of poverty among cotton grow-
ers in Benin from 37 percent to 59 percent
(Minot and Daniels, 2002).  If subsidies were
removed, prices would increase and poor
farmers would benefit (although the magni-
tude of the impact depends on a host of
domestic and international factors, see Porto
and Balat, 2005).    
In 2003, four West African cotton pro-
ducers (Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, and
Mali) launched an initiative to highlight the
damage caused by OECD subsidies and
called for separate negotiations on cotton and
the establishment of a compensation fund.
The  WTO 2004 July package mentioned
above included a compromise solution: keep-
ing the negotiations on cotton under the
Committee on Agriculture, but establishing a
subcommittee to deal with the problem
“ambitiously, expeditiously, and specifically.”
The subcommittee met eight times in the
year leading up to the December 2005 Hong
Kong Ministerial, considering proposals from
West African countries and the EU, but in
the end there was no agreement other than
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5. It is important to recognize that progress in negotiating agricultural trade liberalization is difficult because the
impacts of different concessions are complex and differ across countries.  Some countries that are net importers
of food, for example, would be harmed by the increase in prices that would follow the elimination of agricul-
tural subsidies.
6. Other countries providing subsidies were China ($1.2 billion ), the European Union ($979 million, for pro-
ducers in Greece and Spain), and to a much smaller extent Turkey, Egypt, Mexico, Brazil, Cote d’Ivoire, in that
order (International Cotton Advisory Committee, 2003).reduce cotton subsidies more quickly than
other subsidies.7
Finally, let us turn to the market for ideas
and innovation and look at intellectual prop-
erty rights protection for pharmaceuticals.
Current rules effectively make it more diffi-
cult and expensive for people in poor coun-
tries to get drugs.  Patents exist to allow inno-
vators to recover the costs of research and
development.  But should poor countries be
asked to contribute to such costs equally?  In
fact, it turns out that only a very small frac-
tion of pharmaceutical firms’ profits come
from sales in developing countries.  So, at
least for drugs that address diseases that are
global in nature and for which poor countries
represent a very small share of the market,
not asking poor people to bear R&D costs
would not do much harm to pharmaceutical
companies and would make drugs more
accessible.  Poor countries ought to be
allowed to produce or import generic copies
of patented drugs for global diseases.  This is
one of the key elements of the “generic
region” proposal developed by the late Jenny
Lanjouw to make drugs more available in
poor countries while not damaging incentives
to innovate (see Lanjouw, 2004).  
How to move the agenda forward?
The three examples above illustrate how the
functioning of global markets for unskilled
labor, agricultural products, and drugs favors
rich countries at the expense of poor coun-
tries and poor people, thus exacerbating
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Figure 9: Agricultural subsidies in OECD-DAC countries are on average four times larger
than aid
7. In the meantime, Brazil has successfully used the WTO dispute settlement mechanism to challenge U.S. cot-
ton subsidies.  In its March 2005 final decision, the WTO Appellate Body upheld the conclusions of the dis-
pute settlement body, which had ruled that U.S. subsidies were higher than allowed by the WTO and that they
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Source: OECD-DAC (2004) and OECD (2003).  The Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Development and
Cooperation comprises 23 aid-providing countries (see www.oecd.org).existing differences.  These examples share a
common feature: the processes that set the
rules are, or are perceived to be, unfair.  
Trade agreements and IPR rules stem
from multilateral negotiations in the context
of the WTO, where, while formally each
country has a vote and veto power, effective
ability to participate in and influence deci-
sions varies widely.  Or they stem from
regional or bilateral negotiations, where the
voice of strong countries (and strong interests
in those countries) is even loudest, as IPR
protection clauses in bilateral and regional
U.S. trade treaties amply demonstrate (Fink
and Reichenmuller, 2005).  Migration rules
are almost entirely the result of bilateral
negotiations—in some cases, with aid held
out to get greater controls or used to
strengthen border policing.    
Greater global equity will require more
equitable global rule-setting processes,
including more equitable representation in
global institutions.  The Bank’s own gover-
nance structure draws heavy criticism in
many countries, because it neither reflects the
current weight of emerging markets nor does
it give adequate voice to the poorest countries
that the Bank aims to help.
Changing global policies and institutions
in a pro-equity way is difficult, and the cur-
rent global context offers little to be opti-
mistic about.  Against some modest increases
in aid and the timid steps made by the G8 on
debt cancellation, we are witnessing wide-
spread tolerance of human rights abuses,
near-complete failure to move ahead on trade
talks, and slow (if any) progress on global
governance, from the International Financial
Institutions to the UN Security Council.    
While no one knows how to engineer
change, some factors play a role. Equity-
enhancing changes in global policies and
institutions can come about through action
by governments and coalitions of govern-
ments, informed leadership and grassroots
mobilization, analysis and policy research to
inform alternatives, and networks that dis-
seminate those alternatives.  Good research
on the impact of inequities and evidence-
based advocacy can mobilize both leaders and
public opinion and contribute to change.
Researchers and practitioners who would like
to see greater global equity need to make an
effort to identify actions that are both impor-
tant and have some chance of being imple-
mented, and focus research and advocacy
efforts on them.  Only with much greater
concerted efforts on fewer issues with better-
developed solutions there will be a chance to
move the agenda ahead.  
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